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1. Upon leaving an abusive second husband, a woman I know was discouraged
from seeking a financial remedy. She was advised that when Daniel escaped from
the lion's den, he didn't go back for his hat.
2. Cheryl J. Lee is a J.D. candidate at Pace University School of Law, class of
2003. She graduated magna cum laude from New York University with a B.A. in
English Literature. This article is dedicated to the memory of her grandmother,
Beatrice Mae Bond, who was killed by Charles Melton on Friday, March 16, 1962,
and her mother, Beatrice M. DeFlavis, a survivor of domestic violence. The author
particularly wishes to thank her husband, Ken Ogren, and sons, Nathaniel and
Caleb, for their patience and support throughout the writing of this article. Finally, the author extends her appreciation to Margaret Moreland, reference librarian at Pace University School of Law, for her assistance in locating invaluable
materials and statistics on victims of domestic violence.
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Your desire shall be for your husband,
3
And he shall rule over you.
Othello: Think on thy sins.
Desdemona: They are loves I bear to you.
Othello: Ay, and for that thou diest.
4
Desdemona: That death's unnatural, that kills for loving.
I.

INTRODUCTION

It might surprise many citizens of New York to know that
victims of domestic violence have virtually no financial remedies against their abusers. At a time when the state has a
tough mandatory arrest law for perpetrators of domestic violence, 5 it seems incongruous that abused women do not have
appropriate legal remedies to enable them, financially, to leave
the men who hurt them for good. For example, tort remedies for
victims of domestic violence are virtually non-existent due to
New York's one-year statute of limitations on intentional torts;6
this is just one example of this inequity. Additionally, New
York has a rigorous no-fault equitable distribution law under
which some courts have refused to consider abusive, violent behavior against a spouse as a factor when distributing marital
property upon dissolution of the marriage? Thus, women have
been faced with a conundrum-if they leave their spouse, they
may be unable to support themselves and their children. In the
case of the abused spouse with assets, she may also be faced
with having to share equally with her abuser the fruits of her
labor.8 If the abused woman stays with her spouse, on the
3. Genesis 4:16.
4. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act. 4, sc. 2.

5. Arrest is mandated in New York pursuant to N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 140.10(4) (McKinney 1999).
6. N.Y. CPLR § 215(3) (McKinney 1999).
7. See Section III(b) infra.
8. See, e.g., Kellerman v. Kellerman, 590 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 1992); but
see Pollack v. Pollack, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1999, at 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 1999)
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other hand, out of necessity or otherwise, she may be viewed to
be at fault for putting up with the abuse. 9
Additionally, there is no longer any doubt that women experience the heaviest financial losses in the divorce equation.' 0
Battered women suffer doubly from this inequity, because economic control is often a facet of the coercive relationship between them and their abusers." The abuser will likely
interfere with the battered woman's employment, dominate
family finances, and keep the woman under-funded, as well as
physically abuse her. 12 Thus, battered women will, in all likelihood, require additional financial assistance to leave their
abusers.
This article proposes that repeated acts of domestic violence, which constitute a course of abusive conduct, should affect the share of marital property awarded to an abusive spouse
upon dissolution of the marriage. In the recent case of Havell v.
Islam,13 the New York Supreme Court denied an incarcerated
defendant's motion to preclude his wife from testifying to in(defendant husband who stabbed his wife 8-10 times while she was sleeping was
not entitled to a portion of the plaintiffs law practice, law license and other assets
as a matter of public policy); Brancoveneau v. Brancoveneau, 535 N.Y.S.2d 86
(App. Div. 1988) (defendant husband who hired assassin to murder his wife not
entitled to equitable share of her dental practice which she built through her diligent labor).
9. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991) (Discussing the way in which the
question "why didn't she leave" shapes both the legal and the social inquiry into
battering. This inquiry inappropriately focuses on a supposed female "pathology"
and not on male violence.).
10. The Institute for Research on Poverty reports that of all family groups,
poverty is highest among those headed by single women with children under 18
years. INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, WHO
IS PooR?, at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/faws/faq3.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
See also Richard R. Peterson, A Re-evaluation of the Economic Consequences of
Divorce, 61 Am. Soc. REV. 528, 532 (1996) (reporting that men on average experience at least a 10% increase in their standard of living after divorce, while women
suffer a decrease of 27% or more).
11. See Patricia Horn, Beating Back the Revolution: Domestic Violence's Economic Toll on Women, DOLLARS & SENSE, Dec. 1992, at 12 (emphasis added) ("Battering is not only a punch or a slap. It is any range of actions-physical,
emotional, sexual, and financial-designed to assert a man's power and control
over a wife . . . he may not allow her to do paid work. He may put her on an
allowance and then withhold the money.").
12. See generally id.
13. 718 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
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stances of domestic violence during the parties' twenty-one year
marriage. The Court stated:
the wife alleges the husband engaged in conduct resulting in lasting emotional and physical harm to herself and the parties' children. In this court's view, such conduct, if proven, is so egregious
and shocking that the court must invoke its equitable
power so
14
that justice may be done between the parties.
Although this seems to be a just and proper result, other courts
have held to the contrary. This article will discuss, primarily,
New York's equitable distribution law and its underlying public
policies. It will then consider the narrow egregious conduct exception to the equitable distribution law's no-fault standard of
marital property distribution. The article will next discuss how
New York courts have dealt with incidents of domestic violence
under this egregious conduct standard, and why domestic violence is properly considered under this standard in the distribution of marital property. The article goes on to explore the
possible effect that consideration of acts of domestic violence in
distributing marital property could have in deterring abusers
from further violence as well as in providing a financial remedy
that will enable abused women to more easily escape their
abusers. The problem that tort law poses to the domestic violence victim in a long-term relationship will be addressed, as
well as why a tort remedy is inadequate by itself. Finally, the
Havell v. Islam case will be examined.
II.

NEW YORK'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW

15
Prior to the enactment of the equitable distribution law,
New York courts distributed marital property at divorce according to a title theory: the spouse that held title to property was
the sole owner and the non-title holding spouse was generally
deprived of any property interest therein. 16 Absent a showing of
fraud, the non-title holding spouse, usually the wife, could not
obtain an interest in the property notwithstanding her marital
contributions. 17 In an attempt to rectify the unjust results that
14. Id. at 811.
15. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1999).
16. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 cmt. C236B:24 (McKinney 1999) (McKinney Practice Commentaries).
17. See id.
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often occurred under the title scheme, the legislature enacted
the equitable distribution law that is currently in effect in New
8
York.'
New York's equitable distribution law was expressly enacted to give women a more equal property allocation upon divorce than had previously been afforded to them. 19 In other
words, with a view toward compensating the homemaker
spouse whose contributions were largely unpaid and undervalued, 20 New York enacted a law that provided for the equitable
distribution, as opposed to equal distribution, of marital property upon marital dissolution. Equitable distribution stands for
the proposition that "marriage is a shared endeavor or joint undertaking in the nature of a partnership to which both spouses
contribute-directly or indirectly, financially or non-financially-the fruits of which are distributable at divorce."'21 The
legislature specifically rejected a proposal for the equal distribution of property; however, the consensus of even those who
voted in favor of equitable distribution was that, more often
than not, equal division should be accomplished.2 2 Thus, the
courts are directed to use their equitable powers to see that a
just and fair, and not necessarily equal, distribution of property
is accomplished when marriage ends in divorce.
The concept of equity would appear to give the courts the
power to consider the fault of the parties when determining a

18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Price v. Price, 503 N.E.2d 684, 687 (N.Y. 1986) (emphasis added) ('The
Equitable Distribution Law reflects an awareness that the economic success of the
partnership depends not only upon the respective financial contributions of the
partners, but also on a wide range of nonremunerated services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising children and providing the emotional and
moral support necessary to sustain the other spouse in coping with the vicissitudes
of life outside the home.") (quoting Brennan v. Brennan, 479 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880
(App. Div. 1984); see also MEMORANDUM OF ASSEMBLYMAN GORDON W. BURROWS,
NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATrvE ANNUAL 129, 130 (1980) ("The basic premise for the
marital property ...

reforms .. .is that modern marriage should be viewed as a

form of partnership.").
21. JOHN DEWITT GREGORY, THE LAW OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

(1989) (emphasis added).
22. See N.Y. DOM. REL.

LAW

1 1.03

§ 236 cmt. C236B:24 (McKinney 1999) (McKin-

ney Practice Commentaries).
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just distribution of marital property. 23 Nonetheless, marital
fault is not a specifically enumerated factor in the equitable distribution law. Thirteen such factors were included in the equitable distribution law to provide guidance to courts when they
are distributing marital property. 24 Rather than explicitly including marital fault under the statutory scheme, the legislature provided courts with a catchall provision. 25 "The principal
reason for the existence of this factor is the Legislature's decision to refrain from expressly including or excluding marital
fault from the determination of equitable distribution." 26 Thus,
the discretionary power of the courts became doubly important-not only were the courts enjoined to work equity between
the parties, but they were also empowered to decide the circumstances under which the parties' misconduct would require the
exercise of judicial equity.
New York courts quickly decided not to consider, as a general rule, marital fault as a factor when distributing property.
The seminal case in this regard is Blickstein v. Blickstein.27 In
Blickstein, the appellate court was asked to determine whether
marital fault, i.e. the grounds for dissolution of the marriage,
was a just and proper consideration when determining distribution of marital property under the catch-all provision of the equitable distribution law. The Second Department held that the
consideration of fault would be contrary to the underlying assumption of the equitable distribution law that marriage was to
23. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added) ("Equity-Justice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly
formulated rules of common law... [tihe term equity denotes the spirit and habit
of fairness,justness and right dealingwhich would regulate the intercourse of men
with men .
").
24. "Subdivision 5(b) of Part B of the DRL § 236 sets forth [13] . . . factors
which the court 'shall' consider in determining an equitable distribution. From the
use of the word 'shall,' it is apparent that the Legislature intended the courts to
consider all of the [131 factors but left the relative weight to be accorded to each
factor ... to the determination of the court. . . ." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 cmt.
C236B:25 (McKinney 1999) (McKinney Practice Commentaries).
25. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §236(B)(5)(d)(13) (McKinney 1999) ("In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the court shall consider
(13) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.").
26. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 cmt. C236B:27 (McKinney 1999) (McKinney
Practice Commentaries).
27. 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1984).
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be viewed as an economic partnership. 28 The court reasoned
that because each party had made contributions throughout the
duration of the marriage, upon its termination they were each
entitled to their fair share of the marital estate. 29 The court
further endorsed the proposition that "fault is very difficult to
evaluate in the context of a marriage" and may in fact be traceable to both parties' behavior. 30 The New York Court of Appeals
adopted this reasoning in O'Brien v. O'Brien.3 1 In O'Brien, the
Court of Appeals held that the consideration of marital fault
when distributing marital assets was
inconsistent with the underlying assumption that a marriage is in
part an economic partnership and upon its dissolution the parties
are entitled to a fair share of the marital estate, because fault will
usually be difficult to assign and because introduction of the issue
may involve the courts in time-consuming procedural maneuvers
32
relating to collateral issues.
Thus, rather than make moral decisions as to the relative
right and wrong of the parties to a divorce, the O'Brien court
and subsequent lower courts have decided that these determinations are too difficult to make accurately. Instead, the courts
have chosen to concentrate on the relatively facile adjudication
33
of the economic concerns of the marriage.
There are several policy implications to consider when contemplating the role that fault should play in the judicial division of the marital estate. The argument against consideration
of fault relies primarily on judicial economy and a desire "to
lessen the bitterness and in-court recriminations" that are an
unfortunate aspect of many divorce actions. 34 The proponents
for the consideration of fault in property distribution point out
the socially acceptable role that financial accountability for misconduct can play in holding parties responsible for their culpa28. See id. at 113.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
32. Id. at 719.
33. See generally Russell I. Marnell, MaritalFault in New York: Its Appropriate Role in FinancialIssues, N.Y.L.J., June 16, 1994, at 1, 2.
34. Sally Weintraub, Dividing the Marital Property in the Face of Egregious
Fault, 10 FAM. L.Q. 20, 22 (1987).
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ble behavior. 35 New York courts have chosen to take a Solomonlike approach to the application of fault in property distribution:
although as a general rule misconduct is not a judicial consideration, in extreme cases the courts may use their equitable
power to prevent an at-fault spouse from reaping a financial
windfall in light of their misconduct.
New York courts consider fault in this context according to
a narrow exception to the no-fault rule of property distribution
carved out by the Blickstein court:
[T]here will be cases in which marital fault, by virtue of its extraordinary nature, becomes relevant and should be considered.
But such occasions, we would stress, will be very rare and will
require proof of marital fault substantially greater than that required to establish a bare prima facie case for matrimonial relief
They will involve situations in which the marital misconduct is so
egregious or uncivilized as to bespeak of a blatant disregard of the
marital relationship-misconduct that "shocks the conscience" of
the court thereby compelling it to invoke its equitable power to do
36
justice between the parties.
The egregious conduct exception to the exclusion of marital
fault in property distribution upon marital dissolution is the
current standard in New York. 3 7 However, the standard begs
38
the question: what behavior constitutes egregious conduct?
Triggering fault in the property dissolution context clearly re35. See, e.g., Donald C. Schiller, Fault Still Has a Role in No-Fault Divorce,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 26, 1996, at 6; Marnell, supra note 33; Harvey L. Golden
& J. Michael Taylor, Fault Enforces Encountability, 10 FAM. ADvoc. 11 (1987).
36. Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113-14 (App. Div. 1994) (emphasis added).
37. New York's highest court explicitly adopted the Blickstein egregious conduct rationale in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 719 (N.Y. 1985) ("Except in
egregious cases which shock the conscience of the court, however, [marital fault] is
not a just and proper' factor for consideration in the equitable distribution of marital property . . .[w]e have no occasion to consider the wife's fault in this action
because there is no suggestion that she was guilty of fault sufficient to shock the
conscience.").
38. See Robert D. Lang, MaritalFault and Equitable Distribution:Two Unrelated Concepts, N.Y. ST. B. J., January 1994, at 36. Despite its title, this article
concludes that the concept of egregious fault, although hard to define and apply,
can be an important factor in negotiating or trying a case of equitable distribution.
The article also concludes that as there are no clear standards as to what does
constitute egregious fault, and since the introduction of evidence of egregious misconduct may impact the court's decision regarding property, it is worth the effort to
focus on the fault of the parties when seeking property awards.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/6

8

2002]

ESCAPING THE LION'S DEN

quires more than the level of fault needed to warrant a grant of
divorce pursuant to New York law. 39 The ultimate determination of what constitutes egregious fault is left entirely to the
conscience of the court.
Where does the plight of the domestic violence victim fit
into the equitable distribution equation? Is spousal abuse egregious fault? An examination of the pertinent New York cases
discussed in Section III reveals that the answer to this question
is equivocal, depending as it does on the conscience of the particular judge before whom the aggrieved spouse is appearing.
The predicament of the domestic violence victim throws the discretionary nature of the fault exception to the equitable distribution law into stark relief and raises the concern that personal
prejudices of individual judges as well as societal biases against
battered women are working to deny these victims financial
remedies against their abusers.
An examination of relevant secondary materials justifies
the concern that the determination of domestic violence as egregious conduct may be improperly influenced by a judge's individual bias. As preliminarily noted in the introduction to this
article, there is a significant societal bias against the battered
woman that focuses on the conduct of the abused party and her
perceived failure to leave her abuser. The judiciary is not exempt from this prejudice. 40 The fact is that the act of leaving an
39. Leonard G. Florescue, Reluctance to Deal with Marital Fault, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 4, 1991, at 3.
40. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors,Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J. L. &
FEMINISM 3 (1999):

Most judges come to the bench with little understanding of the social and
psychological dynamics of domestic violence and, instead, bring with them a
lifetime of exposure to the myths that have long shaped the public's attitude
toward the problem. The most persistent of these myths is the belief that
battered women could leave their relationships if they simply chose to do so.
Id.; see also Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as JudicialAnomaly:
Between "The Truly National and The Truly Local," 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1118-20
(Sept. 2001). The author states:
Judges are dependent on cognitive strategies shaped by their past experiences that result in stereotypical assumptions .

. ..

In [domestic violence] cases, prevailing assumptions about independent
and autonomous individuals who freely choose to be, or not to be, in an abusive relationship are based on cultural norms which are contrary to the realities of those women who are without such choices. Ideological axioms that

9
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abuser can be properly classified as hazardous, even suicidal,
and that many factors contribute to the battered woman's inability to escape her abuser. 4 1 The more appropriate inquiry
may be how an abused woman finds the courage to escape at
all. 42 Nonetheless, the examples of judicial prejudice against
the battered woman are legion. 43 In New York, the Task Force
on Women in the Courts reported that many judges "appear not
to understand the nature of domestic violence and the characteristics of offenders and victims." 44 One judge made the following comment regarding his and his colleagues' attitude toward
abused women:
I don't feel sorry for them. Why don't they just get up and leave?
They have been taking these beatings all these years and now
they want me to intercede. All they have to do is get out of the
45
house. It is as simple as that. What do they want from me?
define 'leaving' as the logical and rational response to domestic violence create a construct whereby women who do not conform to this convention are
viewed with suspicion and skepticism.
Id.
41. When a woman finally leaves her abuser and he begins to sense his loss of
control over her, his violence escalates and often results in homicide or severe
physical harm. "The lethality of domestic violence often increases when the perpetrator believes the abused party has left or is about to leave the relationship."
Anne. L. Ganley, Ph.D., Domestic Violence: The What, Why and Who, as Relevant
to Civil Court Cases, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASES: A NATIONAL
MODEL FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATION 19 (Jacqueline Agtuca, et al., eds., 1992). Anecdotally, this was exactly the scenario in the Havell case. When Theresa Havell
informed her husband of twenty-odd years that she wanted a divorce, he crept into
her room one night and bashed her head in with a barbell. Havell v. Islam,
N.Y.L.J., July 30, 2001, at 21 (Sup. Ct. July 30, 2001). Some other considerations
for the domestic violence victim when leaving her abuser are "lack of economic
resources[,] concern for children[,] emotional attachment to the [abuser,] perceptions of the availability of social support[,] and religious and culturally-based values and norms." Epstein, supra note 40, at 39. The significance of the quotations
at the beginning of this article is evidenced here. These excerpts reflect the values
and norms that affect judges just as they do other members of our society.
42. See Horn, supra note 11, at 12.
43. See Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering
Process: Lessons From Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 252
(1993) ("Every study collected substantial evidence that the credibility accorded
women litigants is less than that accorded men litigants ....The list of bad outcomes and bad judging seems endless. Women are put at risk or left at risk for no
good reason.").
44. Report of the NewYork Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 11, 31 (1986) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
45. Id. at 32.
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The answer to the latter question is arguably a greater share of
marital property based upon the physically abusive conduct of
their soon-to-be-former spouses. The Task Force on Women in
the Courts found that, although adequate statutory protections
were in place for battered women, the law's remedial purposes
were not being accomplished because judges were too often uninformed about the nature of domestic violence and the characteristics of victims and offenders. The Task Force determined
that victims' claims were trivialized, and sometimes ignored, by
law enforcement and court personnel discouraging the reporting and filing of claims. Finally, the Task Force found that victims are often presumed to have provoked the attack and are
46
not considered credible unless they have visible injuries.
When considered in light of these findings of judicial and
societal bias, it seems unlikely that the victim of domestic violence will be given appropriate financial relief under the equitable distribution law. The judge has not only the discretion to
decide what constitutes egregious conduct, she then may also
consider the other twelve statutory factors and how much
weight should be accorded to each. If a judge is operating under
a blame-the-victim mentality, it seems unlikely that the battered woman will get a fair share of the marital property.
Judges are directed to consider all twelve factors of Article
13 of New York's Domestic Relations Law Section 236(B)(5)(d)
when distributing property. 47 It stands to reason then that, if
domestic violence as a form of marital fault were a specifically
enumerated factor for judicial consideration, any evidence of domestic violence would by necessity have to be considered by the
court when distributing property. A specific consideration of
such would go a long way in preventing judicial bias from encroaching on a battered woman's award, as the intent of the legislature would be clear that domestic violence should be
contemplated when distributing property. Furthermore, if domestic violence was an explicit factor to be considered under
Domestic Relations Law section 236(B)(5)(d), and a judge disregarded evidence of such, the appellate courts would have more
discretion to reverse or modify property awards that are not
46. See id. at 47.
47. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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based on an appropriate consideration of all factors under the
48
statute.
It is also clear that, when excluding fault as a factor in the
equitable distribution law, the legislature was talking about the
general fault-finding that is necessary to justify a divorce judgment.49 There is absolutely no evidence that the legislature intended to exclude spousal abuse from consideration in
distributing marital property under the statutory scheme. In
fact, the Blickstein court's explicit reservation of a category of
fault that constitutes egregious misconduct that shocks the conscience of the court could logically be construed to refer to acts
of domestic violence. 50 Nonetheless, some courts have excluded
evidence of physical abuse that constitutes a course of abusive
conduct when distributing property. It appears that these
courts are applying the equitable distribution law in a manner
that was never intended by the legislature.
III.

EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT

This section discusses the divergent outcomes in equitable
distribution cases involving allegations of domestic violence.
The first case examined provides an in-depth analysis of the
egregious misconduct concept. In the next category of cases, incidents of domestic violence were not found by the court to constitute egregious misconduct affecting the distribution of
marital property. Finally, those cases in which acts of domestic
violence are the basis for a reduction of a marital property
award are considered.
a. Egregious Misconduct in General
This section addresses a case in which the court provides
the general definition of egregious misconduct. McCann v. McCann5 1l provides a thoughtful discussion of the egregious misconduct standard. In McCann, the wife sought a greater share
48. See Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449, 454 (App. Div. 2002) (trial courts
have broad discretion in determining equitable distribution and the consideration
to be given to the statutory factors).
49. New York continues to retain a fault based divorce scheme. See N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1999).

50. See Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113-14 (App. Div. 1984).
51. 593 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
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of the marital assets because her husband had refused to have
children with her, despite his promise to do so. The issue in
that case was whether this fraudulent misrepresentation of the
husband's intention constituted egregious misconduct. The McCann court noted with regret that the Blickstein court's standard is purely subjective and does not provide guidance as to
what would constitute conscience-shocking actions. 52 The court
went on to opine that a judge's decision as to what sort of behavior should be considered egregious must be based upon "extrinsic evidence of normative societal perceptions of that act."53

Thus, when a judge is to determine whether a spouse's behavior
constitutes egregious conduct, she must consider "whether the
social interest compromised by the offending spouse's conduct is
so fundamental that the court is compelled to punish the offending spouse by affecting the equitable distribution of the marital
assets. '54 The court considered several cases in which a
spouse's conduct was deemed to be so egregious as to affect the
share of marital assets he was to receive, among them a case
involving long history of domestic violence. 55 For the purposes
of this article, it is significant that the court found physical
abuse to be conduct that "callously imperils the value our society places on ...

the integrity of the human body." 56

This article has already discussed the evidence of the existence of societal and judicial biases against battered women.
The executive and legislative branches of the New York government have demonstrated a clear and explicit intention to eradicate domestic violence.57 The question remains as to what
52. See id. at 920.
53. See id. at 920-21.
54. Id. at 921 (emphasis added).
55. See id. at 921-22.
56. Id. at 922. As this article was going to press, the First Department affirmed the Havell decision. In so doing, the appellate court cited this section of the
McCann case as the authority for the proposition that physical spousal abuse that
amounts to attempted murder is egregious misconduct. Havell v. Islam, 751
N.Y.S.2d 449, 454 (App. Div. 2002).
57. "The Family Court Act and Criminal Procedure Law, by and large, provide
an adequate framework for providing relief to victims of domestic violence." Task
Force Report, supra note 44, at 47. See also Weissman, supra note 40, at 111011("Although progress has been made through state and legislative enactments,
there is a criticaldisjuncture between formal law on the one hand, and the implementation of the statutes by the courts in matters involving domestic violence, on
the other."). New York legislators have introduced a bill that seeks to amend the
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normative value the McCann court might expect the judiciary
to examine. Some courts seem to consider the societal belief
that domestic violence victims should leave and, if they do not,
they are "asking for it." In fact, the evidence shows that it is to
this societal bias that some judges refer when adjudicating domestic violence cases and not to the "value our society places on
the integrity of the human body."5 8 The judiciary should be
given stronger guidance by the equitable distribution law,
which could assist in eliminating the ambiguity that leads to
conflicting results in the following cases.
b.

Domestic Violence Not Sufficiently "Egregious"to Warrant
Consideration

The Appellate Division, Third Department has decided a
trilogy of cases in which it held that incidents of domestic violence of varying severity were not sufficiently egregious to warrant consideration in the distribution of marital property. 59 The
department's failure to consider domestic violence during property distribution in two of these cases evidences a misunderstanding of the egregious conduct standard.
The first case dealt with, interestingly, acts of domestic violence by a woman against her husband. 60 In Stevens v. Stevens,6 1 the plaintiff wife struck and scratched the defendant a
number of times, pulled his hair and bit him, as well as
state's Civil Rights Law to provide victims of domestic violence with a civil remedy
against their abusers. Assemb. B. 6223, 224th Sess. (N.Y. 2001) ("[Tlhis legislation will send a message that domestic violence is a significant crime that will not
be tolerated in our society.").
58. See McCann, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
59. See Kellerman v. Kellerman, 590 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 1992); Orofino v.
Orofino, 627 N.Y.S.2d 460 (App. Div. 1995); Stevens v. Stevens, 484 N.Y.S.2d 708
(App. Div. 1985).
60. Domestic violence is overwhelmingly male violence committed against females. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,

INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES

OF VIOLENCE

AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iv (Nov. 2000) [hereinafter VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REPORT], which reports

that "WIomen experience more intimate partner violence than do men: 22.1% of
surveyed women, compared with 7.4% of surveyed men, reported they were physically assaulted" by an intimate during their lifetime. Id. Because women are
three times more likely to be victims than men are, I refer to victims as "she" in
this article and abusers as "he."

61. 484 N.Y.S.2d 708 (App. Div. 1985).
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wounded him with a kitchen knife while attempting to break
into his locked briefcase. 62 The court specifically noted that the
plaintiff's misconduct took place in the "waning" months of the
marriage. 63 The implication is that the wife's behavior was the
culmination of years of frustration confined to a limited period
of time and the product of a bitter breakup. The abusive behavior did not, therefore, "work a divestiture of the property interest ... earned over 15 years of marriage. '64 A fair reading of
this case shows that the misconduct was concentrated toward
the end of the marriage, and was therefore not the result of
years of systematic control and abuse that is characteristic of
the typical battering relationship.65 Thus, it appears that the
court properly refused to consider this conduct when distributing the marital property.
The second case decided by the Third Department is more
disturbing. In Kellerman v. Kellerman,66 the trial court refused,
on fault grounds, to award to the defendant husband the appreciation in value of the plaintiff wife's residence that had been
purchased prior to the marriage. 67 The appellate court reviewed the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint, which consisted of twenty-seven specific incidents of physical assault,
68
verbal abuse and threats during the parties' brief marriage.
The Third Department overturned the trial court's finding that
this conduct was sufficiently egregious as to warrant consideration in apportioning the marital property. Thus the case was
remanded to the trial court for a determination as to the
62. Id. at 710.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Throughout this article I refer to the "abusive" or "battering" relationship.
A useful definition of an abusive relationship, which I use interchangeably with
the term "domestic violence," can be found in the Task Force Report, supra note 44,
at 27. "Domestic Violence is the physical or psychological abuse of one family member by another. This violence occurs in all social groups. Any family member can
be a victim, but experience has shown that women, children, and elderly relatives
are the most frequent victims." Id. "The behavioral definition of domestic violence
focuses on the pattern of abuse and violence in relationships between adults . .. ."
Ganley, supra note 41, at 22 (emphasis added). Thus, a battering relationship normally consists of a variety of abusive behaviors, not all of which are physical assaults, that occur with regularity.
66. 590 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 1992).
67. Id. at 571.
68. Id.
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amount the plaintiff wife's separate property had appreciated
during the marriage. 69 What is particularly disturbing about
the Kellerman case is that the conduct complained of is exactly
the sort of ongoing abusive coercive conduct exhibited by
7
chronic abusers. 0
Although the court in Kellerman specifically cited to, and
relied on, the Stevens decision, the cases are inapposite. In Stevens, the court explicitly stated that the violent episodes occurred during a bitter period near the end of a failed marriage.
In Kellerman, the violent episodes were the cause of the marital
breakdown. The Stevens couple was married fifteen years,
whereas the Kellermans were married only two years when
they separated for the first time. Lastly, the property to be distributed in Kellerman was the appreciation in the wife's separate property, not the "property interest . . . earned over 15
71
years of marriage."
It is hard to discern how the Third Department could conclude that twenty-seven specific episodes of harassment, physical abuse, and threats were not "so outrageous or extreme as to
shock the conscience of the court [so as to] justify [a] divestiture
of certain of the parties' marital property." 72 It is even more
difficult to understand how the Third Department could rely on
a case in which a wife's furious outbursts in the relatively short
period at the end of a long relationship could compare to an abusive course of conduct in a marriage of short duration. If a bias
exists against women who do not timely escape their batterers,
this case sends an ominous message to those who seek to leave
after a relatively short relationship. It demonstrates that a
genuine risk exists that abusive men will seek a share of their
wife's property when she leaves, and may be entitled to it,
under the equitable distribution law.
The final case in this trilogy is Orofino v. Orofino.73 The
court found the defendant husband to have "consumed extraordinary amounts of alcohol," to have verbally abused the
plaintiff wife on a biweekly basis, to have physically abused the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 572.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Stevens v. Stevens, 484 N.Y.S.2d 708, 710 (App. Div. 1985).
Kellerman, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
627 N.Y.S.2d 460 (App. Div. 1995).
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plaintiff (including an episode in which he threw an ashtray at
her, lacerating her scalp), to have threatened to commit arson
and finally, to have placed the muzzle of a rifle against the
plaintiffs head and threaten to kill her.74 Nevertheless, the
trial court held that this behavior should not lessen the defendant's share in the nearly two million dollars invested in a joint
account/stock portfolio. 75 Instead, the defendant husband was
awarded sixty percent of the portfolio based on the fact that he
solely managed the assets and plaintiffs contribution consisted
of "homemaker" activities.7 6 The decision in Orofino seems to
fly directly in the face of the intention of the New York Legislature in enacting the equitable distribution law. The express intent of the legislature was to treat the marriage as a
partnership, with a view toward valuing the homemaker's contributions, and, although an equal division was not mandated,
it was presumed that under most circumstances equal division
77
should be accomplished.
Additionally, the Orofino court relied on the two previous
cases decided by the Third Department discussed above. Both
cases are distinguishable: the Orofinos were married for fifteen
years (unlike Kellerman, where the parties were married for a
relatively short time); also the abuse in Orofino was part of an
ongoing course of conduct (unlike the Stevens case). It is hard
to fathom what part of holding a gun to his spouse's head the
court found not to be conscience-shocking behavior on the part
of defendant. Were that the sole act of misconduct, it might be
sufficient to meet the egregious misconduct standard; taken together with the threats and physical abuse, the "shock the conscience" standard was clearly met.
c.

Domestic Violence is Held to be Egregious Conduct

This section discusses those decisions that have distributed
a greater share of property to an abused spouse. Several courts
have utilized the equitable distribution law's catch-all factor to
afford the domestic violence victim a larger share of the marital
property. A review of the case law reveals, however, that the
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 461.
Id.
Id. at 462.
See supra notes 20 and 22 and accompanying text.
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judiciary seems uncomfortable with this analysis; the judge will
often point to the diminished earning capacity of the domestic
violence victim.7 8 Although very often there is some negative
economic effect on the domestic violence victim, such an effect
should not necessarily be a prerequisite to recovery. The focus
should be not only on the effect that the abusive behavior has on
79
the wife, but also on redressing the husband's misconduct.
Furthermore, it has been shown that women often continue
working in the face of abuse for a number of reasons.8 0 It would
be incongruous to minimize the harm caused by the husband
merely because the abuse did not have the result of destroying
the woman's earning capacity.
It is also notable that in almost every case in which domestic violence is considered during distribution, the ongoing
course of abusive conduct has culminated in a murderous episode that by itself justifies use of the egregious conduct standard. One of the only courts to have explicitly considered an
ongoing course of abusive conduct as sufficiently egregious as to
shock the conscience of the court was the New York Supreme
78. See, e.g., Pollack v. Pollack, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1999, at 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 25, 1999) (injuries inflicted on plaintiff wife during knife attack by defendant
husband resulted in reduced income from her law practice); Murtha v. Murtha,
N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1998, at 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 15, 1998) (long history of violence
led to wife's being psychologically, economically and financially impaired and thus
consideration of the domestic violence must be given in the distributive equation);
Wenzel v. Wenzel, 472 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (two-step inquiry required to determine if fault is to be considered as a factor in equitable distribution,
the first being the finding of fault, and the second step a finding that the fault had
such an adverse physical and/or psychological effect upon the innocent spouse as to
interfere with her ability to be or to become self-supporting); but see, Havell v.
Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449, 453 (App. Div. 2002) (specifically rejecting defendant Islam's argument that a second, adverse economic effect component has been added
to the Blickstein egregious conduct standard).
79. See discussion infra section IV.
80. Women who suffer abuse are found to be employed in approximately the
same numbers as those who have not. Susan Lloyd, Domestic Violence and Women's Employment, at http://www.northwestern.edu/IPR/publications/nupr/nuprv
03nl/lloyd.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2002). Current employment status appears
to be unaffected by women's varying experiences of male aggression in intimate
relationships. On the other hand, women's responses indicate that experience of
male violence and coercion may influence their labor market experience over time.
Id. This would indicate that although a woman seeking property distribution may
be employed at the time she appears in court, she may experience the negative
economic effects of the abuse at a time when the property is distributed and no
modification can be sought.
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Court in Havell v. Islam.8 ' As will be discussed Part IV, however, in its final distributive determination the Havell court relied on a murderous assault and failed to rely on the issue of
ongoing domestic violence in reducing the husband's award.
Despite the reliance on murderous episodes and economic
impairment rather than "mere" domestic violence incidences,
there can be no doubt that courts that have considered domestic
violence as a factor in distributing marital property are using
their equitable powers in a professionally courageous manner.
As domestic violence is not an enumerated factor in the equitable distribution law, the courts use creative reasoning to work
equity for grievously abused women who are leaving a violent
marriage. Thus, we have a number of tortuous opinions with
which the judiciary has had to work to fit the meaning of the
equitable distribution law to the facts of these cases to protect
their decisions from reversal on appeal.8 2 We will examine the
two cases that consisted solely of physical violence, as opposed
to attempted murder, in turn.
Debeny v. Debeny8 3 concerns particularly outrageous behavior by a defendant husband. The court found that the husband
engaged in the following behavior: "Since 1951, the defendant
...slapped the plaintiffs face between fifty and seventy times a
year... in 1965 he broke the plaintiffs foot by stamping it"; in
1970 he pushed her down, causing her to break her ankle; in
1971, he broke her finger causing it to be permanently deformed; in 1974 he "pulled her shoulder out of its socket"; in
1979 he pushed her down, breaking her foot; in 1982, he pushed
her down breaking her arm, and causing a 40% loss of the use of
the arm; in 1986, defendant slapped plaintiffs face so hard that
he cracked two of her teeth, requiring caps and a root canal; the
defendant continuously smacked the plaintiff in the face at the
location of a jaw injury caused by a car accident; and finally, the
defendant threw the plaintiff against the counter in the home
81. 718 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 2000) ("[A] pattern of domestic violence,
properly proven by competent testimony and evidence, is a 'just and proper' factor
to be considered by the Court in connection with the equitable distribution of marital property ..
").
82. See, e.g., Kellerman v. Kellerman, 590 N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 1992) (Appellate Division reversed the nisi prius court's decision denying an abusive spouse
a share in the appreciation of plaintiff wife's separate property).
83. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1991, at 21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 24, 1991).
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causing the plaintiff to sustain back injuries.8 4 The court went
on to award the plaintiff 60% of the marital property and defendant 40%, specifically predicating the award on the defendant's
abuse of plaintiff:
It is now well settled that marital fault is generally not a relevant
consideration unless it is so egregious as to shock the conscience
of the court, and even then, such fault is but only one factor to be
considered by the court. In this case, the defendant's misconduct
toward the plaintiff was not one of sudden anger causing a mo-

ment of corporalpunishment. It was so severe and so brutal as to
clearly demonstrate gross and complete disregard of the marital
relationship. The wife, who is 5'6" and weighs 115 lbs., was used
as nothing more than a slapping, punching and shoving bag by a
defendant, who is 5'9" and weighs 210 lbs. The plaintiff was not
treated as a wife by any stretch of the imagination, nor even as an
employee. At best she was dealt with as an indentured servant
who could be beaten at will!
The court finds the defendant's assaults and conduct toward
the plaintiff to be, at the very least, egregious and that it must be
considered in determining equitable distribution of the parties'
85
marital property.
The Debeny court makes a pertinent point that is also apparent
in the Stevens case. Domestic violence is rarely the result of the
provocation of the abuser by the abused, nor is it a response to
anger or stress.8 6 Thus, physical violence, by either men or women, which results from situational stress, i.e. the bitterness
and recriminations that are the result of an unpleasant
breakup, is arguably not properly considered in the equitable
distribution process, because it does not meet the behavioral
definition of domestic violence.8 7 This distinction between the
84. Id.
85. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
86. Ganley, supra note 41, at 33-34 ("Domestic violence is not caused by 'anger'.

. .

. Displays of anger by the perpetrator are often merely tactics employed by

the perpetrator to intimidate the abused party ....Domestic violence is not caused
by stress .... When we remember that domestic violence is a pattern of behavior

consisting of a variety of tactics repeated over time, then citing specific stressors
becomes less meaningful in explaining the entire pattern.").
87. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Another useful definition of
domestic violence is "a course of coercive conduct that includes physical force and/
or a pattern of mental abuse and control including intense criticism, verbal harassment, sexual coercion and assaults, isolation due to restraint of normal activities
and freedom, and denial of access to resources." DIANA ZUCKERMAN & STACEY
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two types of behavior should go a long way toward easing the
concern of those jurists who express the fear that the abused
woman is merely seeking a tactical advantage in the litigation.
Although important problems of proof exist regarding domestic
violence, it should not be impossible to discern when a plaintiff
is alleging that a course of abusive conduct exists, as opposed to
one or more isolated incidents that occur toward the end of a
relationship. Furthermore, every victim will have to prove her
allegations by competent evidence before meeting the Blickstein
standard.
A course of abusive conduct was at issue in the case of Murtha v. Murtha8 8 as well. In Murtha, the plaintiff husband candidly admitted to physically abusing the defendant throughout
their marriage and for a period prior thereto. The court found
that while generally emotional considerations should not effect
the equitable distribution of property, the outcome of which
should be premised on financial matters, in this instance, the
abuse contributed to the economic and financial impairment of
89
the plaintiff, and consideration had to be given to such actions.
Thus, the property was distributed sixty percent in favor of the
battered spouse.
In this case, we again see the court struggling with the issue of domestic violence. The court notes a reluctance to deal
with emotional considerations when distributing property, the
assumption being that physical abuse of a wife is a by-product
of emotion. As previously stated, domestic violence is calculated behavior, not triggered by stress or anger.9 0 A victim of
such abuse is understandably upset and emotionally damaged,
but to call consideration of abuse an emotional issue ignores the
fact that male violence against women is a significant social
problem regardless of the individual contexts before the courts.
FRIEDMAN, INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, MEASURING THE COST OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THE COSTS
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROJECT, at http://alt.municipia.at/fauen/forumi/daten/

msg00041.htm (February 1998) (on file with Pace Law Review).
88. N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1998, at 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 15, 1998).
89. See id.
90. See Ganley, supra note 41, at 23 ("Domestic violence is purposeful and
instrumental behavior. The pattern of abuse is directed at achieving compliance
from or control over the abused party.").

21

294

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:273

IV. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS
EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT
It is disconcerting that courts could determine domestic violence of the Kellerman and Orofino variety is not sufficiently
egregious to merit a reduction in the offending spouse's share of
the marital property. Perhaps the judges in those cases did not
believe that they were empowered by the equitable distribution
law to reduce a spouse's share of marital property where the
abuse did not consist of severe physical injury. Some members
of the judiciary believe that evidence of physical injury is necessary before domestic violence can justifiably be determined to
have occurred. 9 1 Judges may fear that women will fabricate
battering incidents to gain financial and tactical advantage in
the divorce proceeding. The empirical evidence disproves this
92
assumption, however.
This section examines the statistics and studies with regard to domestic violence that prove that domestic violence is
indeed egregious misconduct which compromises a fundamental societal interest so "that the court is compelled to punish the
offending spouse by affecting the equitable distribution of the
marital assets."93 The article will next discuss how the consid91. See Task Force Report, supra note 44, at 33:
More pernicious still is some judges' requirement of visible physical injury ....
Although evidence of physical injury is relevant... it is not the
sine qua non of domestic violence. Psychological abuse, threats of violence
and menacing with a weapon do not leave physical scars. Injuries are often
to parts of the body covered by clothing: breasts, abdomen, groin. The judicial requests for visible proof of injury are perceived to betray an attitude
that women's testimony is not credible unless corroborated by a bruise, a
laceration, or a black eye.
The heightened scrutiny of battered women's credibility is "in direct
contrast to the facts of the domestic-violence literature: Battered women
don't exaggerate; they tend to minimize, to deny the severity and extent of
the abuse[,] to protect the abuser and to hide their shame."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting New York Task Force On Women Public Hearing
48 (Mar. 5 1985) (Rochester) (testimony of Mary Lee Sulkowski)).
92. "Some judges, attorneys and court personnel erroneously presume that petitions for orders of protection filed by women during the course of a matrimonial
action are 'tactical' in nature. This assumption fails to appreciate the many legal
disincentives to filing a petition as a litigation tactic and that, in a violent relationship, violence is particularly likely to occur after a divorce action has been commenced." Id. at 47.
93. McCann v. McCann, 593 N.Y.S.2d 917, 921 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
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eration of domestic violence in distribution of marital property
will likely have several beneficial results. These benefits include deterring the abuser by holding him financially accountable for his misdeeds, and providing the abused woman with the
financial means to escape her abuser, which might help to mitigate the adverse economic effects of divorce on women and their
dependent children. Finally, an alternative viewpoint will be
discussed, which holds that domestic violence victims should
seek a tort remedy for their damages, a viewpoint that this article concludes is unrealistic under the current tort scheme in
New York.
America is a violent society. 94 The nature of the violence
95
that American's experience is also dependent on gender. Violence against women is primarily intimate partner violence;
64% of women who report being abused since age eighteen were
victimized by an intimate partner, as opposed to 16.2% of
men. 96 Studies indicate that societal norms contribute to the
prevalence of domestic violence. 97 The consequences of violence
are more severe for women than for men; a woman is significantly more likely to be injured than a man during an assault,

94. "Physical assault is widespread among adults in the United States: ...an
estimated 1.9 million women and 3.2 million men are physically assaulted annually in the United States." VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REPORT, supra note 60, at
iii.
95. See, Ganley, supra note 41, at 41.
96. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REPORT, supra note 60, at iv.
97. See, Ganley, supra note 41, at 30:
Domestic Violence is learned not only in the family but also in society. It is
learned and reinforced by interactions with all of society's major institutions: the familial, social, legal, religious, educational, mental health, medical, entertainment/media etc. In all of these social institutions there are
various customs that perpetuate the use of violence as legitimate means of
controlling family members at certain times (e.g. religious institutions that
state a woman should submit to the will of her husband; laws that do not
consider violence against intimates a crime). These practices inadvertently
reinforced the use of violence to control intimates by failing to hold the perpetrator accountable and by failing to protect [the] abused party.
Id. See also Demi Kurz, Women, Welfare and Domestic Violence, 25 Soc. JUST. 105
(1998) (The state in practice condones male violence because government welfare
policies provide little support for women to live independently of men, and this
policy effectuates a government refusal to facilitate female escape from male
violence.).
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and the risk of an injury to a female increases when the assail98
ant is an intimate partner.
Domestic violence, and violence against women in general,
has a negative effect on society as a whole. Examples of the
direct costs that domestic violence has on society are the expense of emergency room care for victims, the effect of domestic
violence on the well-being of children who witness the abuse,
foster care expenditures, the cost of sheltering homeless women
seeking to escape their abusers and the cost of prison stays and
detention for abusers. 99 Indirect costs to the community include
the effect on the battered woman as a productive employee'0 0 as
well as the psychological effects on battered women. 10 1
The reluctance of certain jurists to consider domestic violence as "sufficiently egregious to shock the conscience of the
court" seems ludicrous in light of the research pertaining to domestic violence. If the analysis applied by the McCann 10 2 court
is correct, and the judiciary should consider that misconduct
that compromises significant societal interests when effectuating equitable distribution, then domestic violence should be considered as such because the empirical evidence indicates that
domestic violence exacts a heavy toll from our society. It is not
a huge leap in logic to assert that domestic violence, as prevalent and damaging as it is, should be at least accorded the same

98. See, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REPORT, supra note 60, at iv (39% of female physical assault victims, compared to 24.8% of male assault victims reported
being injured during their most recent physical assault; additionally, women assaulted by an intimate partner reported being injured more often than women who
were assaulted by other types of perpetrators).
99. See generally ZUCKERMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 87.
100. See id. See also Ganley, supra note 41, at 53-54; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS 7-8 (1998)
[hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES] (research indicates that abu-

sive partners disrupt women's work-related activities by calling them frequently

during the day, coming to their place of employment unannounced, harassing the
women at work, making them purposefully late for work and failing to provide
promised child care).
101. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, supra note 100, at 8-9 (Women
who are abused often experience "chronic health problems, low self-esteem, and
depression.").

102. 593 N.Y.S.2d 917, 920 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
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weight in distributing property as, for instance, the tax conse10 3
quences to the parties.
Nor is it fair to say that domestic violence is an emotional,
as opposed to a financial, issue. 10 4 Domestic violence has a significant impact on the productivity of the female worker and of
her ability to obtain and keep a job. 10 5 Spousal abuse has direct
adverse economic effects on society as a whole. It is also wrongful behavior inflicted by the human being who the battered woman should justifiably be expected to trust and rely upon more
than any other.
Furthermore, there are several beneficial aspects to holding the abuser financially accountable for his misdeeds. Our society countenances holding its members responsible for the
wrongs they commit. 10 6 Failing to hold an abusive spouse financially accountable for his abusive behavior lowers the stakes in
the divorce scenario. The abuser stands to lose nothing more
than his spouse if he engages in abusive conduct. Significantly,
those states that do not consider fault in distributing assets on
divorce have had a greater frequency of spousal abuse than
those that do consider fault. 0 7 Holding the batterer financially
accountable will send a message that abuse will not be tolerated
and may deter the batterer 0
103. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(10) (McKinney 1999).
104. See, e.g., supra notes 86 and 90 and accompanying text.
105. See generally, Connie Stanley, Domestic Violence: An Occupational Impact Study (July 27, 1992) (unpublished study, on file with Pace Law Review); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A WORKPLACE ISSUE (October 1996); Lloyd, supra note 80.
106. "Considering fault among the other equitable factors in dividing property
... does nothing but allow a court to consider things that most people instinctively
think of as fair in making an equitable financial settlement between parties to a
failed marriage." See Donald C. Schiller, Fault Still Has a Role in No Fault Divorce, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 26, 1996, at 6.
107. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 891-92 (1994) ("Abuse indeed seems to be related to
the absence of penalties embodied in the divorce statutes.").
108. See CHRISTOPHER D. MAXWELL, JOEL H. GARNER & JEFFREY A. FAGAN,
U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF ARREST ON INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE:

NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE SPOUSAL ASSAULT REPLICATION PROGRAM (2001). This
report found that arrest was associated with less repeat offending and that the

effectiveness of arrest does not vary by jurisdiction. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse
draws an analogy to a financial remedy in the form of a marital tort claim and
mandatory arrests or fines for domestic violence. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82
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Providing an abused woman with the economic means to
leave her abuser permanently is a very important potential beneficial effect of the consideration of domestic violence in the equitable distribution of property. Divorce has adverse financial
effects on women in general. 0 9 Several factors contribute to the
so-called phenomenon of the "feminization of poverty." Primarily, women often forgo career opportunities to stay home and
raise the children born to the marriage. 110 This has an adverse
effect on their ability to become wage earners."' Women in
general earn less money then men do. In New York, the earnings ratio between men and women employed full-time, all year
in 1997 was 79.3%. 112 Women thus earn about eighty cents for
every dollar that men earn. Women generally receive the nonliquid assets in a divorce, such as the marital home and household furnishings. 1 3 Women are therefore often placed at a financial disadvantage when the marriage comes to an end.
Victims of domestic violence suffer acutely from this inequality. Very often an abuser will use financial means to conGEO. L.J. 2525, 2557 (1994). It stands to reason that the threat of losing a share of
the marital property would have a similar deterrent effect.
109. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text.
110. See ALLAN M. PARKMAN,No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 87-88
(1992).
111. See id. at 87:
The decision by married couples for the wife to take primary responsibility
for the child rearing traditionally has made women less attractive employees than men, with the result that businesses have tended to pay them less
and promote them more slowly. The problem is circular. Women earn less
than men, so it is rational for families to decide that the mothers will be the
parents with the primary responsibility for rearing the children, but at the
same time, one of the reasons why women tend to have lower wages is because they assume the role. Career-oriented women find it difficult to convince employers that they are not the typical woman and as a result, they
often are adversely affected.
Id. See also Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic Consequencesof Divorce, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485, 495-96 (1985) ("The economic
consequences of divorce are especially adverse for women. In most cases, children
remain with the mother, who usually has considerably lower potential labor market earnings than her former husband, partly because her responsibilities for the
children are likely to reduce her labor supply and may have limited her past
human capital investments.").
112. See THE GENDER WAGE GAP, INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH
FACT SHEET (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.iwpr.org/.
113. Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce, 32 FAM. &
CONCILIATION L. REV. 11, 11 (Jan. 1994).
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trol his victim. 114 As a result, she may have virtually no money
at her disposal. The battered woman who is employed may be
subject to harassment at work that jeopardizes her job. 1 5 She
may suffer significant physical and psychological harm that affects her ability to work." 6 Faced with these obstacles to financial independence, many abused women choose to stay with the
abusive spouse rather than subject their children to a life of
poverty. If women were assured a greater share of the marital
assets, such as at least half of a million dollar stock portfolio (as
was at issue in Orofino"7), doubtless they would leave their
abusers sooner and stay gone more frequently.
V.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS AN INTENTIONAL TORT

Ira Mark Ellman, Chief Reporter of the American Law Institutes Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis
and Recommendations argues quite forcefully against considering spousal abuse in the distribution of property upon divorce.
He asserts that compensation for non-financial losses that are a
118
result of the other spouse's battery is better left to tort law.
Professor Ellman premises this conclusion on the fact that
"[w]ith the general demise of interspousal immunity, tort remedies for spousal violence are readily available." 1 9 In New York,
however, there are virtually no cases in which a spouse has successfully brought an action against her abuser and obtained relief.120 This is due in large part to the substantial procedural
hurdle to bringing an intentional tort claim against a long-term
partner in New York: a one-year statute of limitations.' 21
114. See Horn, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
115. See ZUCKERMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 87.
116. See REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, supra note 100, at 8-9.
117. 627 N.Y.S.2d 460 (App. Div. 1995).
118. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28
Amiz. ST. L.J. 773, 808 (1996).
119. Id.
120. In my research I was able to discover only one such case. See Pollack v.
Pollack, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1999, at 40 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 1999).
121. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3) (McKinney 1999). The portion of this article
which deals with the statute of limitations for intentional torts and the applicable
tolling provisions is adapted from a previous article by the author entitled What
Congress Knew: Victims of Domestic Violence Deserve a Civil Damages Remedy
(Spring 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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The policy behind a statute of limitation is to provide the
wrongfully injured party with a reasonable opportunity to secure compensation while protecting potential defendants from
the risk of perpetual liability for past actions. Additionally, the
limitations periods are set to maximize judicial fairness and reliability of outcome by disfavoring stale suits where evidence
has been lost, memories have faded and witnesses are unable to
be located. 122 To mitigate the sometimes harsh and unjust results, many jurisdictions provide for tolling of statutes of limitation in certain circumstances.
There are two tolling devices that could be successfully employed in domestic violence situations. The first such device is
the continuous tort doctrine. A continuous tort is one that is inflicted over time, and it involves wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted. A continuing tort sufficient to toll a
statute of limitations is occasioned by continual unlawful acts,
123
not by the continuing ill effects from the original violation.
When applied to the domestic violence situation, the continuous
tort doctrine would treat the entire course of abusive conduct by
a spouse as a single, ongoing tort, rather than treating each individual assault as a distinct cause of action. The advantages of
the continuous tort doctrine in a domestic violence situation are
clear. The wrongful conduct of the domestic violence tortfeasor
usually occurs over the course of a relationship, resulting in a
cumulative harm from intermittent, regular incidents that can
be characterized as "continuing." Thus, under this doctrine, a
victim of domestic violence can recover for injuries that result
from all of the defendant's conduct, and she is not limited to
only those tortious acts falling within the applicable statutory
period.
The continuous tort doctrine as applied to intentional tort
cases in New York is contradictory. 1 24 In New York, a tort is
treated as continuing in two circumstances. The first circum122. Lisa Napoli, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Survivors of Domestic
Violence Who Wish to Recover Civil Damages Against Their Abusers, 5 CIRCLES
BUFF. WOMEN'S J. OF L. AND SOC. POL'Y 53, 55 (1997).
123. See David E. Poplar, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Battered Women after Giovine v. Giovine: CreatingEquitable Exceptions for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 161, 186 (Fall 1996).
124. As there are so few cases in New York which employ a tolling provision to
provide a domestic violence victim with a civil tort remedy (in fact, only one, Nuss-
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stance occurs when the complained of behavior necessary to satisfy the elements of the tort takes place over the course of more
than one year. For instance, the tort is considered to be continuing in the case of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, when conduct that, taken together, because of the
length of time the behavior goes on and its continuous nature, is
considered to satisfy the outrageousness standard, i.e. ongoing
sexual harassment. 125 The conduct, which spans a period of
time longer than the limitations period, can constitute an actionable tort only when considered in aggregate. This ongoing
tort theory is to be distinguished from a string of similar incidents, such as a series of spousal assaults, each of which constitutes a discreet tort.
The principal appellate division case for this proposition is
Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co. 26 In Foley, the plaintiff asserted
that if any of the alleged intentional acts occurred within the
period of limitation, then those acts occurring prior to the limitation period were also not time-barred. 127 The appellate court
rejected this argument. The cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was limited to conduct occurring
within the one-year period immediately preceding the action's
commencement. 128 Therefore, if a course of conduct, as, for example, in the case of domestic violence, consists of several separate incidents, each of which constitutes a discreet tort, then
the statute of limitations is not tolled. The cause of action accrues when the elements of the tort are met and that is when
the statute begins to run. Thus, under this theory of the continuing tort doctrine in New York, each battering incident would
in all likelihood constitute a separate tort, and only those batbaum v. Steinberg, 703 N.Y.S.2d 32 (App. Div. 2000)), I examine tolling for intentional tort actions as analogous to the domestic violence action.
125. See Stram v. Farrell, 646 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195 (App. Div. 1996). The dissent
opined that there was no reason to utilize the continuing course of conduct approach where, as in this case, the earlier acts standing alone warrant the imposition of liability and caused damages at the time they were perpetrated. Id. at 19799 (Yesawich, J. dissenting); see also Weisman v. Weisman, 485 N.Y.S.2d 570
(App. Div. 1985) (alleged incidents of intentional infliction of emotional distress
occurring more than one year before the filing of plaintiffs' claim barred by the
statute of limitations).
126. 626 N.Y.S.2d 906 (App. Div. 1995).
127. See id. at 907.
128. See id.
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tering incidents within the year preceding filing a suit would be
actionable.
New York claimants have been successful under the continuous course of conduct theory when alleging a course of concerted conduct by a tortfeasor which was therefore considered a
continuing tort. 129 This manifestation of the continuous tort
doctrine is more favorable to the victim of domestic violence
who may suffer abuse for several years before ending the relationship. Unfortunately, the New York Court of Appeals has
not yet dealt with the issue of a continuous course of conduct
doctrine of tort liability directly, and, therefore, it remains to be
seen which theory New York will eventually follow. Thus, a
good deal of uncertainty exists as to whether this doctrine
could, or would, be utilized to toll a statute of limitations in a
spousal tort action predicated upon allegations of domestic
violence.
The second theory under which the statute of limitations
might be tolled is the statutory toll for infancy or insanity. 130
This theory is thought to be the "most appropriate in the context of domestic violence." 13' The basic standard for insanity
within the scope of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules section 208 is the individual claimant's "inability to protect [his or
her] legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in
society." 132 The insanity standard has been strictly construed. 133
129. See, e.g., Drury v. Tucker, 621 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App. Div. 1994) (plaintiff
sufficiently set forth concrete factual allegations of a continuing course of conduct
that terminated within one year of plaintiffs commencing the action); see also
Misek-Falkoffv. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 556 N.Y.S.2d 331 (App. Div. 1990) (court
implied that if concrete factual allegations of a continuing or concerted course of
action against plaintiff were established, the court might consider the issue of
whether the acts that occurred outside the limitations period could be considered
as a part of a "continuing" tort).
130. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208 (McKinney 1999). The statute provides in pertinent
part that "[11f a person entitled to commence an action is under a disability because of infancy or insanity at the time the cause of action accrues . . . [and] the
time otherwise limited is less than three years, the time shall be extended by the
period of disability. The time within which the action must be commenced shall not
be extended by this provision beyond ten years after the cause of action accrues
131. Napoli, supra note 122, at 54.
132. McCarthy v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 460 (1980)
(plaintiff not permitted to toll statute of limitations based on a post traumatic neurosis that prevented him from confronting the memory of his accident).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/6

30

20021

ESCAPING THE LION'S DEN

303

Hearings to determine the mental condition of the plaintiff
seeking a toll have become common, 134 as the question of insanity is largely one of fact.
The Appellate Division, First Department employed the insanity toll recently in the context of a battered woman in the
infamous Nussbaum v. Steinberg case. 135 In that case, the
plaintiff, Hedda Nussbaum, instituted an intentional tort action
to recover money damages from the defendant for the extensive
physical and psychological injuries he inflicted upon her from
1978 until November 2, 1987.136 The plaintiff conceded that
almost all of the events alleged in the complaint occurred more
than one year before the action was commenced. The plaintiffs
injuries arose from incidents of psychological and physical
abuse that transpired during the course of their relationship,
which began in 1978 and ended with Mr. Steinberg's arrest in
November, 1987. The lawsuit was thus filed within one year of
the last incident of abuse. As is the case with many victims of
domestic violence, however, Ms. Nussbaum suffered abuse for
several years before seeking, or being compelled to accept, assistance. Under traditional application of the statute of limitations, Ms. Nussbaum would only be permitted to recover for
abuse that occurred during the one-year limitation period; that
is, between 1986 and 1987. The argument for tolling the statute
of limitations for victims of domestic violence is especially
poignant in cases such as this, where the victim is completely
under the dominion of the abuser for years.
Ms. Nussbaum argued:
[T]he defendant's physical and psychological abuse rendered her
incapable of independent thought or conduct, and that she
thereby suffered from insanity within the statutory meaning of
133. See Eisenbach v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 479 N.Y.S.2d 338, 339-40 (1984),
in which the plaintiff brought an action fifty days after the statute had run. Plaintiff claimed that for the 68 days immediately following the accident the statute
should have been tolled, as he was hospitalized for that period and unable to understand or protect his rights due to the continuous administration of narcotic
painkillers. The court held that the concept of insanity, usually "equated with unsoundness of mind, should not be read to include the temporary effects of medications administered in the treatment of physical injuries." Id. (citation omitted).
134. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208 cmt. C208:3 (McKinney 1999) (McKinney Practice Commentaries).
135. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 1997 at 26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 1997).
136. Id. at 26.
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[T]he abuse [the plaintiff! experienced at the

hands of the defendant was so severe and violent, that the result
rendered her incapable of effectively functioning in society and
137
precluded her from protecting her legal rights.
The court held in pertinent part:
the law cannot presently exclude or blindly ignore domestic violence causes from the tolling provision under CPLR § 208, where
the allegations of such domestic violence can be proven to constitute in an individualan overall inability to function in society as a
result.
...In instances where a batterer's primary goal is often abso-

lute control over every aspect of the victim's life, the combination
of such extensive control and violence may disable one's independent judgment and functioning so as to place that person within
the insanity definition of CPLR § 208.138
The court did recognize the special problem of the domestic violence victim when it stated: "Significantly, because [of] the
usual close proximity and/or relationship of the domestic violence abuser and the victim, the abused and battered person is
often less able than intentional tort victims to obtain legal protection or recourse after being abused or assaulted. . ...139 It is
pertinent to note, however, that the court qualified its holding
by requiring the domestic violence victim to prove that the victim was unable to function overall in society as a result of the
physical and psychological abuse. The court went on to say that
"[alt a minimum, a significant deficit in one's mental capabilities must be demonstrated .... Where the evidence shows that
an individual is generally able to care for oneself and is aware of
any possible claims that might exist, courts will disallow the
tolling of the applicable Statute of Limitations." 140 Ms. Nussbaum satisfied the statutory standard by offering expert testimony to the effect that as a result of consistent, long term
abuse, she was incapable of functioning independently of the
defendant and therefore unable to make her own judgments
about her life or the protection of her interests. Ms. Nussbaum's
severe, documented injuries, as testified to by expert witnesses,
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Nussbaum, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 1997, at 26.
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supported her claim of disability based on psychological abuse
to the extent that the Statute of Limitations was tolled even
under the rigorous standard imposed by the New York Court of
Appeals.
There are several problems with employing the statutory
tolling provision by reason of insanity in cases of domestic violence. Primarily, by labeling the victim as "insane," and requiring her to prove the extent of her mental disability before tolling
the statute, the focus is taken off the abuser's wrongful conduct
and placed on the victim's mental state.1 4 1 Additionally, because the standard is rigorous, it may be that only those women
who have suffered the most severe abuse over many years will
be able to benefit from its employment. The exception is underinclusive in that many women who are abused continue to function out of necessity in everyday life, persisting in their careers
and carrying on the duties of their households. Furthermore,
"[w]hile women may prevail using this argument, insanity may
not be the best option since it feeds into the stereotype that women are helpless and cannot fend for themselves." 142 It is abhorrent to perpetuate this misconception about the female as a
victim; additionally, many women do not fit the paradigm of the
cowering, weeping wife. It cannot be said that all victims of domestic violence who suffer from battered woman syndrome or
other psychological constraints are so far impaired as to "be unable to function in society." Many women in fact "keep up appearances" for years while being battered. 143 These women are
not any less entitled to remuneration for their damages than
the woman who is more profoundly affected in other areas of
her life.
141. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
142. Napoli, supra note 122, at 60.
143. See supra text accompanying note 79; see also Weissman, supra note 40,
at 1123:
Credibility issues are critical in domestic violence cases, where a batParadoxitered woman's testimony may be the only available evidence ....
cally, if she does speak with confidence and authority, she may appear

without vulnerability and fear, without-in other words-those traits most
commonly associated with victimhood. She will not conform to the stereotype of a battered woman, likewise impugning the credibility of her story in
the eyes of a judge.

Id. (Citations omitted).
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Based on the inability of most abused women to bring a tort
action for the majority of the abuse they have suffered, it seems
logical to provide them with a greater share of the marital property to compensate them for the damages they have suffered as
a result of domestic violence. It may also work to deter abusive
spouses from abusing in that it provides a financial disincentive
to abuse. Furthermore, holding the abusive spouse accountable
for his misconduct is a socially desirable result in that it discourages violent behavior, which has reached epidemic proportions in the United States. Consideration of domestic violence
under the equitable distribution law also provides the abused
spouse with the economic ability to leave their spouses for good.
VI.

HAVELL V. ISLAM

Havell v. Islam144 provides a useful illustration of the state
of the law with regard to domestic violence victims and the distribution of marital property. It is also an interesting case because it involves people from the upper echelon of our society.
It is often assumed that domestic violence is a phenomenon that
effects only the poor. 145 A contemporary news report described
the parties as follows: "Mr. Islam, a former securities executive,
is serving an 8 1/3 year sentence in an upstate prison after
pleading guilty to first-degree assault on his wife, who heads a
money management firm."1 46 The fact that this couple was
wealthy caught the attention of the media and the case was reported on the front page of The New York Law Journal.
Plaintiff Theresa Havell and defendant Aftab Islam were
married on May 17, 1978 in New York City. 4 7 They had six
children together. "The wife began her career in the financial
industry at Citibank, where she worked from 1970 to 1978. The
husband began his career in the financial industry in 1967, as a
144. N.Y.L.J., July 30, 2001, at 21 (Sup. Ct. July 30, 2001).
145. See Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1223, 1249 (July 2001) (referring to the societal belief that only poor women at the margins of society suffered from abuse in the home, and documenting
how the feminist movement has revealed that domestic violence occurs at all rungs
of the socioeconomic ladder).
146. Cerisse Anderson, Lower StandardSet for Evidence of Abuse; Patternof
Violence Ended in Attack with Barbell, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 2000, at 1, col. 5.
147. Havell, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 2001, at 21.
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trainee for Citibank in Pakistan."148 From 1990 until the date
of the assault, Ms. Havell provided the economic support for the
family. The family owned three residences, including a Brown149
stone in New York City where the assault at issue occurred.
In the court proceeding to determine the issue admissibility of
evidence of domestic violence in the marriage, Ms. Havell testified to numerous incidents of psychological and physical abuse.
150
Her two older children corroborated her testimony.
The Havell court recounted the chronology of events during
Islam's final abusive rampage as follows. On April 5, 1999, Ms.
Havell informed her husband that she wanted a divorce. "In
the early morning hours of April 22, 1999, the wife awoke and
saw [her] husband enter her room and sit in a chair across the
room. He was wearing yellow rubber gloves and carrying a barbell in his hands." 15 1 She sat up and "the husband came over to
the bed, pinned the wife down with his knee, and attacked her
with the barbell," hitting her again and again on her face and
head. 15 2 The parties' three daughters and their nanny rushed
into the room upon hearing the wife's screams. Islam told them
in a matter-of-fact tone that he had killed their mother. One
daughter, who turned fifteen that day, called 911.153 The husband left the room and returned with an industrial sized roll of
saran wrap, at which time the parties' twelve-year-old daughter
attempted to restrain her father from beating her mother with
the roll. He left the room and returned with a towel, which he
attempted to put over the wife's face. The police arrived soon
after and arrested the husband. 5 4 Ms. Havell was taken to the
hospital. She suffered multiple contusions, a broken nose and
jaw, required numerous stitches on her face, the surgical installation of titanium plate over her eye, more than twenty hours of
dental procedures, and multiple other oral and facial surgical

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Havell, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 2001, at 21.
Id.
Id.

35

308

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:273

procedures over the following months. 1 5 As a result of the at156
tack, she also suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder.
The parties stipulated to a grant of divorce in favor of Ms.
Havell. 157 Islam pled guilty to a charge of first-degree assault in
relation to the incident on August 11, 2000.158 During the equitable distribution phase of the dissolution of their marriage, Islam sought by means of an Order to Show Cause to exclude
evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence at trial, arguing
that such conduct was not a "just and proper" consideration
under the equitable distribution law. 159 The court phrased the
issue as follows: "In considering the equitable distribution of
marital property, may the court properly admit evidence at trial
of a pattern of domestic violence in a marriage of long duration
pursuant to Domestic Relations Law section 236(B)(5)(d)(13)...
60
and the standard set forth in . . . [Blickstein v. Blicksteinl?"'
The court answered the question in the affirmative. The court
noted that its holding constituted an expansion of "the egregious conduct standard to include a pattern of physical and
emotional abuse during a lengthy marriage." 16 1 In coming to
this decision, however, the court considered its decision justified
in light of the jurisprudence of fifteen other states which consider such fault in distribution of marital property, literature
regarding domestic violence and its effect on the abused spouse
162
and her children.
The final distribution in the Havell case differs from many
other cases in that the judge awarded 100% of the remaining
marital assets to the injured wife.' 6 3 Significantly, however, the
judge did not reach the issue of whether the ongoing course of
abusive conduct should reduce the abuser's share of assets; in155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Havell, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 2001, at 21.
158. Id.
159. See Havell v. Islam, 718 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
160. See id. at 808; Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div.
1984).
161. Havell, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
162. See Havell, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11.
163. See Havell v. Islam, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 2001, at 25 (Sup. Ct. July 30,
2001). The court permitted the husband to retain funds advanced to him prior to
the final determination of equitable distribution. Thus, the court in fact awarded
Islam 4.5% of the marital estate.
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stead, she predicated the distributive award in part on the assault of April 22, 1999. Relying on an extreme, murderous
episode of the sort suffered by Ms. Havell falls squarely within
settled New York jurisprudence which awards to the victim a
greater share of marital property predicated on attempted murder, and not a course of conduct that constitutes "merely" domestic violence. This sort of judicial caution may be the product
of the elusive egregious conduct standard. Although a jurist
may wish to provide the battered woman with a greater share of
marital assets, the judge's concern has to always be whether
her opinion that the abusive conduct was sufficiently egregious
as to warrant consideration in property distribution will hold up
on appeal. If not, the appellate division will modify the award
or reverse the judgment. In order to protect the awards they
make to the abused spouse, then, trial courts are forced to fit
their decisions into narrow categories of economic impairment
1 64
or murderous incidents.
The First Department made a pronouncement in a recent
affirmance concerning the nature of the equitable distribution
award that does not appear to. bode well for other cases in which
domestic violence is a factor in property distribution. "While
fault may be considered for purposes of equitable distribution
when conduct is so egregious as to shock the conscience (surely
the situation here), even then, such conduct is only one factor to
be considered and does not necessarily preclude an award of equitable distribution."165 A fair reading of the court's statement
in this regard is that the appellate division may be concerned
that other courts will go too far in dispossessing abusive
spouses of their right to an equitable share of the marital estate. As the legislature stated when enacting the equitable distribution law, a consideration of all thirteen enumerated factors
is required in the property distribution equation. 16 6 It would
have been a grave injustice, however, had the supreme court's
property distribution award been modified in this matter. Justice Silbermann explicitly considered each of the statutory fac164. The First Department also based its affirmance on the murderous nature
of the final assault on Ms. Havell. See Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449, 455
(App. Div. 2002).
165. Havell v. Islam, 734 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (App. Div. 2001).
166. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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tors in her decision to award the entire marital estate to the
wife. Apart from the consideration of Islam's egregious conduct
in physically abusing his wife, the court found that Ms. Havell
supported the family unit from 1990 forward, as well as had
primary responsibility for raising the children. 167 The fact that
Ms. Havell was the primary breadwinner reflects a disjunction
between perceptions of the battered woman and the reality of
the abusive relationship. Women are not always the economically disadvantaged victim; Ms. Havell was a wealthy woman in
her own right who provided for her family. As women in our
society gain more economic power, they also gain access to the
legal resources that can afford them a more equitable resolution
of their legal disputes. However, as discussed above, the woman who is confident and economically self-sufficient will often
be viewed with scorn for not leaving her abuser sooner. 168 Furthermore, the bias against battered women for not leaving their
abusers is often more pronounced when a moneyed spouse endures abuse over many years of a long-term relationship. The
Havell court examined all of the pertinent factual circumstances and in consideration of Ms. Havell's overwhelming contributions to her large family, both financial and emotional,
while suffering demeaning and painful abuse by her husband,
properly determined that the entire marital estate was justifia169
bly Ms. Havell's due share.
The issue of whether a violent course of conduct is properly
considered under New York Domestic Relations Law Section
236(B)(5)(d)(13) is still very much open. 170 In order to resolve
the conflicts that are the result of judicial uncertainty and to
provide consistent results that protect victims, the New York
Legislature needs to create a clear standard for use in the domestic violence situation.
167. See Havell v. Islam, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 2001, at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 31,
2001).
168. See text accompanying note 80.
169. Havell, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 2001, at 25. The First Department affirmed
the award as within the trial court's discretion. Havell, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449, 455
(App. Div. 2002).
170. See, e.g., Bodolato v. Bodolato, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 2002, at 24 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 25, 2002) (alleged domestic violence alone does not meet the egregious
conduct standard asserted in Havell).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/6

38

20021

ESCAPING THE LION'S DEN
VII.

311

CONCLUSION

A review of the literature and case law pertaining to the
effects of domestic violence reveals that economics are a key issue for abused women. Nonetheless, New York does not have in
place a satisfactory scheme to compensate the victim of domestic violence and to assist her in her rehabilitation from years of
abuse. 17 1 The current egregious conduct standard for the consideration of marital fault, including domestic violence, in effect
in New York does not provide the domestic violence victim with
consistent redress in the form of a larger share of marital property upon equitable distribution. Nor can the victim of domestic
violence seek a tort remedy; very often her claim is barred by a
rigorous application of New York's one-year statute of limitations for intentional tort actions. Thus, in order to send a clear
message to abusers that their conduct will not be tolerated by
our society, as well as to insure that a victim of domestic violence receives a greater share of marital property where warranted, the equitable distribution law in New York should be
amended to include a specifically-enumerated domestic violence
factor for judicial consideration when distributing marital
property.

171. A proposed amendment to New York's Civil Right's Law that would provide a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence and gender animus has languished before the New York State Assembly's Governmental Operations
Committee since March, 2001. See Assemb. B. 6223, 224th Sess. (N.Y. 2001).
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